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Measurements play a crucial role in doing physics: Their results provide the basis on which we adopt
or reject physical theories. In this note, we examine the effect of subjecting measurements themselves
to a measurability: We assume that theories account for interactions so that they are empirically
traceable, and that observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system.
In consequence of these assumptions, we are lead to contextual theories. Contextuality becomes
a means to render interactions, thus also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement
becomes problematic if one tries to commensurate the assumption of tangible interactions with the
notion of a spectator theory, i.e., with the idea that measurement results are read off without effect.
The measurement “problem,” thus, presents itself as the collision of different epistemologic stances.
I. INTRODUCTION
The infamous Wigner’s-friend experiment [1–3] serves to
illustrate the measurement problem [4, 5]: If we imag-
ine Wigner performing a measurement on his friend who
measured another system, there are different—in fact,
incommensurable—uses of the term “measurement:”
(M1) If the friend’s “measurement” of a state in an
equal superposition with respect to his measure-
ment basis is regarded as an interaction between
two systems—modelled by a physical evolution—,
then it corresponds to a unitary on the joint sys-
tem, yielding an entangled joint state;
(M2) if the “measurement” leads to exclusively one of
several possible outcomes, and, thus, allows to
judge the validity of a theory.
Statements (M1) and (M2) conflict as follows: The lin-
earity of quantum mechanics cannot be reconciled with
value-definiteness—i.e., the outcome being exclusively
one of several possibilities.
The incommensurability is not so much a peculiarity—
or defect—of quantum mechanics. Instead, we argue
that it appears in theories that (a) account for interac-
tions so that they are empirically significant, (b) require
that an observation necessarily goes with such an inter-
action, (c) are falsifiable, and (d) in which experimental
results have a minimal stability. The first two require-
ments render an observation itself empirically traceable.
They are combined in the interaction assumption:
(IntA) Interactions are empirically traceable. An observa-
tion necessitates such an interaction.
The last requirement (d) is a generalization of Popper’s
characterization of physics being concerned with repro-
ducible effects1 to the demand that asking the same ques-
1“Indeed the scientifically significant physical effect may be defined
as that which can be regularly reproduced by anyone who carries
out the appropriate experiment in the way prescribed.” [6, §I.8,
emphasis in original]
tion twice will yield the same answer:
(ISys) There exist conditions under which two equivalent,
subsequent measurements performed on the same
system yield the same answer. These conditions
are independent of the questions asked.
A system satisfying these conditions will be called iso-
lated.
II. DESCRIBING SYSTEMS
We discuss how to abstractly represent measurements
in light of falsifiability and (ISys). We follow the path
of quantum logic [7–12]—without actually referring to
quantum mechanics—, and rely on notions of ordered
sets and lattices as briefly summarized in the Appendix.
Along the way, we put the program into a new perspec-
tive.
We think of a measurement as an inquiry about a bi-
nary question, i.e., about a question with two possible
answers t and f. The binary questions are represented
by elements in a set Q. By the requirement (ISys), there
exists an equivalence relation on Q, such that under ap-
propriate conditions, two equivalent questions α ∼ β
with α, β ∈ Q yield equal answers. Let us denote by Q
the corresponding set of equivalence classes. To en-
sure falsifiability [13], we assume that for any equiva-
lence class a ∈ Q, there exists a unique complementary
class ¬a ∈ Q such that an inquiry about any question
in a yields t if and only if an inquiry about any question
in ¬a yields f.2
We assume that the elements in Q allow for a partial
temporal order: If a measurement corresponding to α
is performed before another one β, then α <t β. The
conditional on Q, i.e., α→ β, is defined as follows:
2Subsequently, we denote elements in Q by Greek letters, elements
in Q by Latin letters, and variables representing answers to ele-
ments in Q by the corresponding capital Latin letters.
2If the inquiry about α yields t, then a subse-
quent inquiry about β >t α yields t.
The conditional on Q induces an order relation on the
set of equivalence classes, a < b for a, b ∈ Q, if verifying
the order relation does not break the equivalence: If we
inquire about consecutive questions
α <t β <t α
′ <t β
′, with α→ β, α ∼ α′, β ∼ β′,
then we assume to still obtain equal answers for α and α′,
as well as for β and β′. Thus, we demand that the sub-
lattice generated by {a,¬a, b,¬b} is distributive if a < b.
If there exist elements 0 and 1 such that a ∧ ¬a = 0
and a ∨ ¬a = 1 for all a ∈ Q, then the above sublat-
tice requirement renders the complement defined above
order-reversing and leaves us with an orthocomplemented
lattice of classes of equivalent questions (Q,<).3 To en-
sure the distributivity of the sublattice defined above, we
require the lattice to be orthomodular, i.e., to satisfy the
following:
If a < b, then a ∧ (¬a ∨ b) = b .
III. INTERACTING SYSTEMS
We now turn to the question how to ensure the interac-
tion assumption (IntA). An obvious way to trace interac-
tions is to “ask the system whether it interacted.” This
assumes the existence of a corresponding equivalence
class qint ∈ Q. If we inquire consecutively about α <t σ
with σ ∈ qint, then we expect σ to yield t independent
of the result of the inquiry about α. This should also
hold for ¬α. It follows that qint > α ∨ ¬α, and, there-
fore, qint = 1. Thus, the interaction assumption cannot
be realized by a single inquiry about questions in a spe-
cial equivalence class in Q.
Yet, we can establish within Q whether an interaction
occurred by how questions relate to one another. In par-
ticular, if we aim to position the characteristic “having in-
teracted” dichotomously to “being isolated” as described
in (ISys), then the former characteristic is expected to
be relational as is the latter. Following this path, we
demand that equivalent questions σ, σ′ ∈ qint inquired
about before and after an interaction corresponding to
an inquiry about a question α ∈ a with σ <t α <t σ′
do not necessarily yield the same answer independent of
3If a < b, then
b ∧ ¬a = (a ∨ b) ∧ ¬a = (a ∧ ¬a) ∨ (b ∧ ¬a)
by distributivity. With a ∧ ¬a = b ∧ ¬b,
b ∧ ¬a = (b ∧ ¬b) ∨ (b ∧ ¬a) = b ∧ (¬a ∨ ¬b) ,
thus, ¬a > ¬b.
what the result of the inquiry about α is. For the equiv-
alence classes this entails4
(qint ∧ a) ∨ (qint ∧ ¬a) 6= qint . (1)
That is, qint is incompatible with a. Equivalently, the
sublattice generated by qint and a is not distributive (see
Appendix). As compatibility in an orthomodular lattice
is symmetric, the interaction corresponding to inquiries
about questions in qint can be traced inversely with in-
quiries about questions in a.
To ensure that all elements in Q correspond to trace-
able interactions, we require that in the orthomodular
lattice Q, the sublattice Z of elements compatible with
all other elements in the lattice, called the center, con-
tains merely 1 and 0. The requirement for Q to form
an orthomodular lattice with trivial center is sufficient
to satisfy the interaction assumption. Subsequently, we
turn to the question whether it is necessary.
A. Assigning probabilities
The above discussion is inspired by quantum mechanics:5
The set of orthogonal projectors on a Hilbert space P(H)
forms an atomic, orthomodular lattice with the order re-
lation
P < Q ⇐⇒ P (H) is subspace of Q(H) .
Gleason’s theorem [14] establishes a one-to-one corre-
spondence between probability distributions over P(H)
and density matrices if dimH ≥ 3. With projectors form-
ing equivalence classes along a real time parameter,
Qqm = P(H)× R , and Qqm = P(H) ,
quantum mechanics carries the lattice structure before
assigning probabilities. A priori, the lattice structure
of Q is not evident: A theory does not primarily make
statements about the relation α→ β.
More generally, theories yield probability distributions
for time-ordered sequences of questions,6 i.e.,
P
(
(α1, A1), (α2, A2), . . .
)
with αi ∈ Q, αl <t αl+1, Ai ∈ {t, f} ,
where neither Q has a pre-established conditional, nor Q
a natural lattice structure. Then, the requirement (ISys)
that consecutive equivalent questions
α ∼ β, α <t β, α, β ∈ Q
4Imagine inquiring about σ <t α <t α′ <t σ′ where σ, σ′ ∈ qint, α ∈
a, α′ ∈ ¬a. Then, σ 6→ σ′. The same is the case for σ, σ′ ∈ ¬qint.
5See, e.g., [12].
6In this approach, a map, analogous to the Born rule, is an essential
part of physical theories. In classical mechanics, for example, such
a “Born rule” consists of assigning deterministic probabilities to
subsets of phase space. As we discuss below, this is only possible
because the subset lattice is a Boolean lattice.
3yield equal answers A,B ∈ {t, f} translates to
P(A = B) = P(A = 1, B = 1) + P(A = 0, B = 0) = 1 .
Let us consider the possibility that the probability de-
rives from a unary function
µ : Q→ [0, 1]
such that µ(α) is the probability for the answer to α is t.
From the above formulation of (ISys), it follows that
P(A = B) = µ(α)µ(β) + (1− µ(α))(1 − µ(β)) = 1
which is the case if and only if µ(α) = µ(β) = 0
or µ(α) = µ(β) = 1. Thus, the function µ : Q → {0, 1}
takes merely two values, and is constant within an equiv-
alence class a ∈ Q. Therefore, there is an induced func-
tion µ′ : Q → {0, 1}. An immediate consequence is that if
the question qint from above is an element Q, then inquir-
ing about the question “whether the system interacted”
yields either always t or always f, independently of in-
quiries about any other question. This is a contradiction
with (IntA). A theory satisfying both (IntA) and (ISys)
cannot allow for an assignment of probabilities to ele-
ments in Q independent of inquiries about other, non-
equivalent questions: The theory is contextual [15, 16].
To ensure a minimal detectability of inquiries and their
corresponding interactions, we are lead to assume the
following, similar to Heisenberg uncertainty: For any α ∈
Q there exist equivalent β1 ∼ β2, β1 <t α <t β2 such that
P(B1 6= B2) =
∑
A,B
P(B,A,¬B) ≥ ε
for some ε > 0.
To connect this back to the lattice formalism, we ask:
Does a contextual theory satisfying (ISys) and (IntA)
give rise to an orthomodular lattice on Q? Employing
the contextuality, we define the order relation a < b by
P((β, t) |(α, t)) = 1
∀α ∈ a, β ∈ b , and
P(A1 = A2) =
∑
A,B
P(A,B,A) = 1
∀αi ∈ a, β ∈ b, α1 <t β <t α2 ,
and the complement ¬a by
α′ ∈ ¬a ⇐⇒ P((α′, f) |(α, t)) = 1 and
P((α′, t) |(α, f)) = 1 .
Assuming falsifiability, we demand that the complement
exists and is unique. While this yields a complemented
and weakly modular poset, it is not clear whether it also
constitutes an orthomodular lattice. For the remainder
of this text, we assume that Q forms an orthomodular
lattice.
The converse of the above consideration is: What prob-
ability distributions can be assigned to an orthomodular
lattice? Let us assume that Q forms such a lattice and
that µ′ : Q→ [0, 1] is a function that satisfies
µ′(0) = 0 , µ′(1) = 1 ;
if a, b are compatible, then
µ′(a) + µ′(b) = µ′(a ∧ b) + µ′(a ∨ b) ;
if µ′(ai) = 1 then µ
′
(
∧i ai
)
= 1 .
If we impose (ISys), then, with the same reasoning as
above, µ′ is a dispersion-free state [17]. From Theorem I
in [17] and Theorem 1 in [18], it follows that if there
exists a dispersion-free state on Q then the center Z is
not trivial. Therefore, if we require (IntA) and (ISys),
then any assignment of probabilities to elements in Q
must be contextual.
IV. ISOLATED SYSTEMS
After the discussion in Section III, we are now able to ex-
plicate the notion of an isolated system consistent with
the two assumptions (ISys) and (IntA): A system is iso-
lated if and only if inquiries about any two equivalent
questions α ∼ β, α, β ∈ Q yield equal answers with cer-
tainty.
To empirically verify whether a system is isolated—
at least for the time between two inquiries—, one in-
quires about any two equivalent questions and compares
the thus obtained answers. If the answers differ, then
the inquiries detect an intermediate inquiry about a
non-compatible question, and the system is not isolated.
While the equality of the answers is necessary, it is, how-
ever, not sufficient for the system to be isolated.
This empirical test is an essential ingredient in a key-
distribution protocol like [19]. Inversely, any theory sat-
isfying the assumption (IntA) and (ISys) allows for a sim-
ilar protocol.
V. INTERACTIONS WITHIN A JOINT
SYSTEM
We now turn to interactions within an isolated system,
i.e., between different parts of a joint system. Two sys-
tems, S1 and S2, together can again be regarded as one
system assuming that the ability to refer to S1 and S2 suf-
fices to refer to the corresponding combined system. The
joint system consisting of S1 and S2 is denoted S1 × S2.
In [8], Piron shows that an orthomodular lattice has
a trivial center if and only if it is irreducible, i.e., the
lattice cannot be written as a direct union, defined as
follows: The direct product of orthocomplemented lat-
tices Li with i ∈ I, forms another orthocomplemented
lattice Lp with the order relation
x > y, x, y ∈ Lp ⇔ xi > yi ∀i ∈ I
and the orthocomplementation
¬x = (¬x1, . . . ,¬xi, . . .) .
4It follows from (IntA) that the lattice Qc cannot be the
direct product of lattices Q1 and Q2.
We imagine S2 to be a friendly experimenter measur-
ing S1, inspired by the Wigner’s-friend experiment [1–3].
Let us, for now, merely consider S1: Before and after
our friend inquires about a non-trivial α ∈ Q1 we inquire
about two equivalent α′ ∼ α′′ that belong to an equiv-
alence class incompatible to the one represented by α.
The joint system S1 × S2 is however isolated. Thus, the
equivalence classes of the joint system are not induced
by the subsystems if they interact: Despite, α′ ∼ α′′
in Q1, (α
′, 1) 6∼ (α′′, 1) in Qc. The friend’s inquiry about
a non-trivial α ∈ a ∈ Q1 is characterized as follows:
If (α1, σ) <t (α2, β) ∈ Qc with αi, α ∈ a ∈
Q1, then α1 ↔ α2 and α1 ↔ β, for some σ.
A measurement effects an implication that reaches across
systems. It is a case not accounted for in a product
lattice. In particular, the measurement establishes the
equivalence between (σ, α1) and (β, α2) in Qc while σ
and β might not be equivalent in Q2. Let us denote m ∈
Q the equivalence class of (σ, α1) and (β, α2). The char-
acterizations also implies: (a, 1) and (a, 0) are equivalence
classes in Qc with (a, 0) < m < (a, 1). In particular, the
equivalence class n ∈ Qc represented by (σ, α′1) is incom-
patible with (a, 0) and (a, 1) if a′ ∈ Q1 is incompatible
with a ∈ Q1. Therefore, also n and m are incompatible.
To empirically test whether the two subsystems S1
and S2 interact with one another, one empirically tests
the equivalence relation on Qc by inquiring about ques-
tions in the same equivalence class and verifying that
their answers match (see Section IV). Imagine, we ini-
tially inquired about a question in n. To verify that Sc
is isolated, and, thus, the two subsystems interacted, we
inquire about a later element in n. By the incompatibility
of n and (a, 1), we cannot at the same time empirically
test whether the system interacted, and know about the
result of the measurement.
We encounter the measurement problem: We cannot
meaningfully—i.e., with the suitable empirical support—
speak of the measurement as an interaction between two
systems, while maintaining the idea of the measurement
yielding definite results.
VI. THE EPISTEMIC IMPORT:
SPECTATOR THEORIES
The measurement problem unfolds if we compromise the
Interaction Assumption (IntA) in order to save the mea-
surement and its result from contextual dependences.
Thus, the measurement problem exposes the idea that
we can read off measurement results without effects for
the measured system—the idea of a spectator theory.
The theory of knowing is modelled after what
was supposed to take place in the act of vi-
sion. The object refracts light to the eye and
is seen; it makes a difference to the eye and to
the person having an optical apparatus, but
none to the thing seen. The real object is the
object so fixed in its regal aloofness that it is
a king to any beholding mind that may gaze
upon it. A spectator theory of knowledge is
the inevitable outcome. [20, §1, p.26]
The quest for certain measurement results is an epistemic
problem: If knowledge is scientific knowledge and science
is natural science, then the anchor of our knowledge is
observation and measurement. And if knowledge must be
constituted of certainties, then these observations cannot
carry contextual dependences.7
For Dewey in his pragmatic critique of absolute knowl-
edge, quantum mechanics promises to get the natural sci-
ences back on the path instituted by Galileo: The path
of a dissolution of the distinction between immutable ab-
solute knowledge and practical activity guided by belief.
The work of Galileo was not a development,
but a revolution. It marked a change from
a qualitative to the quantitative or metric;
from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous;
from intrinsic forms to relations; from aes-
thetic harmonies to mathematical formulae;
from contemplative enjoyment to active ma-
nipulation and control; from rest to change;
from eternal objects to temporal sequence.
The idea of a two-realm scheme persisted for
moral and religious purposes; it vanished for
purposes of natural science. [20, §4, p.92]
For Dewey, Heisenberg uncertainty was less of a problem
for maintaining physics as a spectator theory, but rather
a door opener towards overcoming the idea itself.
The element of indeterminateness is not con-
nected with defect in the method of observa-
tion, but is instrinsic. The particle observed
does not have fixed position or velocity, for
it is changing all the time because of inter-
action: specifically, in this case, interaction
with the act of observing, or more strictly,
with the conditions under which an obser-
vation is possible; for it is not the ‘mental’
phase of observation which makes the differ-
ence. Since either position or velocity may be
7The spectator theory relates to correspondence theories of truth, as
Habermas points out: “The meaning of knowledge itself becomes ir-
rational—in the name of rigorous knowledge. In this way the naive
idea that knowledge describes reality becomes prevalent. This is
accompanied by the copy theory of truth, according to which the
reversibly univocal correlation of statements and matters of fact
must be understood as isomporphism. Until the present day this
objectivism has remained the trademark of a philosophy of science
that appeared on the scene with Comte’s positivism.” [21, §II, p.68f,
emphasis in original] The criticism of spectator theories relates to
critiques of correspondence theories of truth as, e.g., in [22–25].
5fixed at choice, leaving the element of inde-
terminacy on the other side, both of them are
shown to be conceptual in nature. That is,
they belong to our intellectual apparatus for
dealing with antecedent existence, not to fixed
properties of that existence. An isolation of a
particle for measurement is essentially a de-
vice for regulation of subsequent perceptual
experience. [20, §8, p.194, emphasis in origi-
nal]
The “intrinsic element of indeterminateness” is taken as
an indicator for the participatory and practical elements
of knowing.
The change [that Heisenberg uncertainty calls
for] for the underlying philosophy and logic
of science is, however, very great. In relation
to the metaphysics of the Newtonian system
it is hardly less than revolutionary. What
is known is seen to be a product in which
the act of observation plays a necessary roˆle.
Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is
finally known. Moreover, the metaphysics of
existence as something fixed and therefore ca-
pable of literally exact mathematical descrip-
tion and prediction is undermined. Know-
ing is, for philosophical theory, a case of spe-
cially directed activity instead of something
isolated from practice. The quest for cer-
tainty by means of exact possession in mind
of immutable reality is exchanged for search
for security by means of active control of the
changing course of events. Intelligence in op-
eration, another name for method, becomes
the thing most worth winning. The princi-
ple of indeterminacy. It marks the acknowl-
edgment, within scientific procedure itself, of
the fact that knowing is one kind of interac-
tion which goes on within the world. [20, §8,
p.195f]
Dewey, expecting the eye-opening effects of quantum
mechanics, disregards his own, earlier concern about the
Galilean revolution:
But—and this ‘but’ is of fundamental
importance—in spite of the revolution, the
old conceptions of knowledge as related to an
antecedent reality and of moral regulation as
derived from properties of this reality, per-
sisted. [20, §4, p.92]
The idea of immutable knowledge did not only survive
the Galilean but also the quantum revolution. It merely
changed what could be absolutely known. With a theory
that satisfies (IntA) and (ISys), we cannot expect to know
answers to all questions that a system can be inquired
about. But we can still hope for either some properties
to be more fundamental than others—the Bohmian way
out of the problem—or for the theory to expose the real
structure of the world—the Everettian, or Parallel Lives,
way out of the problem. In both cases, there remains a
real and absolute element antecedent to any act of know-
ing that can be known at least “in principle.”8 This saves
an essential aspect of spectator theories, namely, the pos-
itivist idea that we can gain access to something that is
independent of our act of knowing.
If, however, the measurement problem reminds us that
“Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally
known.” [20, §8, p.195]9—just as antecedent “meaning”
is a myth [24]—, then we are led to a very different re-
flection [28]. Following Habermas, we are in fact led to
unwind the positivist removal of reflection.10 The idea
that cognition must be scientific cognition can be under-
stood as a belief that we have put into the scientific act
of knowing, and not something that the world imposes
on us.11 The measurement “problem” opens the door for
reflection, for imagining new ways of looking at science
and of doing physics [29].
VII. CONCLUSION
The requirement that there are isolated systems for which
inquiries about equivalent questions yield equal answers
combined with the demand for traceable interactions
leads to contextual theories. With measurements corre-
sponding to an interaction between two systems, we face
a measurement problem: We cannot meaningfully—i.e.,
with the suitable empirical support—speak of the mea-
surement as an interaction between two systems while
maintaining the idea of the measurement yielding definite
results. As such, the measurement problem exposes an
incompatibility between epistemological stances beyond
8The term “in principle”—very much like “demons”—are used to
indicate that something is exempt from actual experience [26].
9The idea has been established before by Fleck: “Denn Erkennen
ist weder passive Kontemplation noch Erwerb einzig mo¨glicher Ein-
sicht im fertig Gegebenen. Es ist ein ta¨tiges, lebendiges Beziehung-
seingehen, ein Umformen und Umgeformtwerden, kurz ein Schaf-
fen. [. . . ] Erkenntnisse werden von Menschen gebildet, aber auch
umgekehrt: sie bilden Menschen.” [27, p.48] — “For cognition is
neither passive contemplation nor acquirement of uniquely possible
insight in the readily given. It is an active, lively partaking in re-
lationships, a shaping and being reshaped, in short a creative act.
[. . . ] Insights are formed by people, but also inversely: they form
people.” [27, p.48, own translation]
10“That we disavow reflection is positivism.” [21, p.vii, emphasis in
original]
11“From then on, the theory of knowledge had to be replaced by a
methodology emptied of philosophical thought. For the philosophy
of science that has emerged since the mid-nineteenth century as
the heir of the theory of knowledge is methodology pursued with
a scientistic self-understanding of the sciences. ‘Scientism’ means
science’s belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no
longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but
rather must identify knowledge with science.” [21, §I, p.4, emphasis
in original]
6quantum mechanics: The idea that knowledge is consti-
tuted of absolute certainties entails a spectator theory.
A spectator theory, does, however, preclude empirical
evidence for interactions during measurements, i.e., for
evidence that our knowledge has support from outside of
us, support from our contact with the world around us.
The incompatibility turns into a tension within posi-
tivism: The idea of an external source for our knowledge
conflicts with the adherence to a spectator theory needed
to ensure absolute knowledge.
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APPENDIX: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
TO LATTICES
Definition 1 (Lattice). A partially ordered set (L,<)
with unique greatest lower bound a ∧ b and unique least
upper bound a ∨ b is called a lattice.
7(a) If the lattice has a minimal element 0 and a maxi-
mal element 1, then the lattice is called bounded.
(b) An orthocomplementation is a map a 7→ ¬a such
that
a ∧ ¬a = 0, a ∨ ¬a = 1, if a < b : ¬a > ¬b .
(c) In an orthocomplemented lattice L, two ele-
ments a, b are orthogonal, denoted a ⊥ b, if a < ¬b,
or, equivalently, b < ¬a—using the order reversing
property of the ortho-complementation.
(d) An orthocomplemented lattice L is orthomodular if
it satisfies weak modularity, i.e., for all a < b:
a ∨ (¬a ∧ b) = a ,
or, equivalently, if a > b:
a ∧ (¬a ∨ b) = a .
(e) A lattice L is distributive if for any a, b, c ∈ L
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c) .
Definition 2 (Compatibility). Two elements in a lat-
tice, a, b ∈ L are called compatible, if the lattice generated
by {a,¬a, b,¬b} is distributive.
If for a, b ∈ L
a ∧ (¬a ∨ b) = b ¬b ∧ (b ∨ ¬a) = ¬a ,
then the elements
0, a,¬a, b,¬b, a ∧ ¬b,¬a ∨ b, 1
form the distributive sublattice generated
by {a,¬a, b,¬b}.
Theorem 1 (Compatibility I). In an orthomodular lat-
tice L, a and b are compatible if and only if
(a ∧ b) ∨ (¬a ∧ b) = b . (2)
The proof consists of combining Theorem (2.15)
and (2.17) in [8].
Proof. If the sublattice is distributive, then
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b) = a and (a ∧ b) ∨ (¬a ∧ b) = b .
It remains to show that (2) is sufficient. First we show
that compatibility is symmetric: If (a∧ b)∨ (¬a∧ b) = b,
then, with a ∧ (a ∨ c) = a for any c,
a ∧ ¬b = a ∧ (¬a ∨ ¬b) ∧ (a ∨ ¬b)
= a ∧ (¬a ∨ ¬b) = a ∧ ¬(a ∧ b) .
As a > (a ∧ b), we employ orthomodularity,
a = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬(a ∧ b)) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b) ,
which proves the symmetry of compatibility. Further, we
have to show equalities of the form
(a ∧ b) ∨ ¬b = a ∧ ¬b . (3)
Note, first, that in any lattice a ∧ b < b and, therefore,
(a ∧ b) ∨ ¬b︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:c1
< a ∨ ¬b︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:c2
.
Applying orthomodularity, i.e., c2∧(¬c2∨c1) = c1, yields
(a ∨ ¬b) ∧
(
(a ∧ b) ∨ (¬a ∧ b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=b
∨¬b
)
= (a ∧ b) ∨ ¬b
and, thus, we obtain (3).
Note the important role of weak modularity in the
proof above.
Theorem 2 (Compatibility II). In an orthomodular lat-
tice L, a is compatible with b if and only if there exists
mutually orthogonal elements a′, b′, c ∈ L such that
a = a′ ∨ c b = b′ ∨ c .
Proof. If a and b are compatible, then
(a ∧ b) ∨ (¬a ∧ b) = b
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b) = a
and thus we can set
c := a ∧ b a′ := a ∧ ¬b b′ := b ∧ ¬a
which yields the orthogonal elements. If, inversely, a
and b can be expressed in the above form, then
¬a ∧ b = ¬a′ ∧ ¬c ∧ (b′ ∨ c)
= b′ ∧ ¬a′ = b′
using weak modularity. Furthermore,
a ∧ b = (a′ ∨ c) ∧ (b′ ∨ c)
< (a′ ∨ c) ∧ (¬a′ ∨ c)
= (a′ ∨ c) ∧ ¬a′ = c
using weak modularity again, and, thus, with
a ∧ b = (a′ ∨ c) ∧ (b′ ∨ c) > c
we obtain a ∧ b = c. This yields 2.
Theorem 3 (Existence of dispersion-free states). On an
orthomodular lattice L, there exists a dispersion-free state
if and only if there exists an atom in the center of the
lattice.
We follow the proof of Theorem I in [17] and the proof
of Theorem 1 in [18].
8Proof. We first show that the existence of a dispersion-
free state µ implies that there is an element in the center
of L different from 0 and 1. Let Lµ := {a ∈ L | µ(a) = 1}.
Note that Lµ 6= ∅. For any totally ordered subset T of Lµ,
the element a0 = ∧{a ∈ T } ∈ Lµ by the properties of a
dispersion-free state. Thus, with Zorn’s Lemma, Lµ has
a minimal element am.
Let us now show that am ≤ a ∀a ∈ Lµ: If a1 ∈ Lµ, then
there must exist an a2 6= 0 with a2 < am. Otherwise am∧
a1 = 0 which contradicts the requirement of a dispersion-
free state. By weak modularity and Theorem 1, there
exist an b ∈ L orthogonal to a2 such that a2 ∨ b = am.
If µ(a2) = 0, then µ(b) = 1 and, thus, b ∈ Lµ and b <
am, thus, b = am. But then, a2 = 0 and we obtain a
contradiction, and we conclude that µ(a2) = 1. This
yields, again, a2 = am, and then am < a1.
We now show that am lies in the center of L: For
any b ∈ Lµ, am < b and the two commute by weak
modularity. If b /∈ Lµ, then with µ(b) + µ(¬b) = µ(b ∨
¬b) = µ(1) = 1 it follows ¬b ∈ Lµ. Thus, am < ¬b and,
therefore, am is compatible with ¬b and thus with b.
Now, we show that am is an atom in L, i.e., ∀b ∈
L, b < am either b = am or b = 0. It suffices to show
that if b /∈ L, b < a then b = 0: In this case, ¬b ∈ Lµ,
and ¬b > am > b. Therefore, b ∧ b < b ∧ ¬b = 0.
It remains to construct a dispersion-free state from an
atom a in the center of L: Let µ(a) = 1. Any b ∈ L
commutes with a, and thus a ∧ b exists and a ∧ b < a.
Since a is an atom, either a ∧ b = 0 and, therefore, b = 0
and µ(b) = 0, or a ∧ b = a. In the latter case, a < b
and µ(b) = 1. Thus, µ is dispersion-free.
Lemma 1 (Incompatible elements). If a < b and a are
not compatible with c for some a, b, c ∈ L, then also b
and c are incompatible.
Proof. We have to show: If a < b and b is compatible
with c, then also a is compatible with c. Let us consider
a ∧ ¬c = a ∧ ¬c′ ∧ ¬d Thm 2 : c = c′ ∨ d
= a ∧ b′ ∧ ¬d c′ ⊥ b′
= a ∧ b′ d ⊥ b′
= a ∧ b = a a < b
and thus
(a ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ ¬c) = (a ∧ c) ∨ a = a .
